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Weatherlessness: Affect, Mood,
Temperament, the Death of the Will, and
Politics

First, I develop an account of the nature of moods and the relation of mood to emotion
and temperament. This account stresses that social and individual moods are marked
by four features: They are transactional - neither wholly subjective nor objective; in
experience they shade into and blur back and forth with feeling and temperament; they are
ambient and atmospheric, a habit of living ·in the world more expansive than a habit of
mind; and, whether conscious or not, moods have causes that, if known, may be
manipulated to advance both personal and political ends. Second, I focus on a particular
mood that, following the novelist John Barth, I term "weatherlessness." I then
distinguish weatherlessness from both learned helplessness and manufactured consent.
Third, I conclude by showing ways in which weatherlessness is fatal to democracy, to
government of, by, and for the people. Here I suggest ways in which weatherlessness can
be a tool used by authoritarian regimes, including those that disguise themselves as
democracies.
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1. Moods
Supposing that truth is a mood- what
then? Supposing every philosophy and every
politics expresses the mood of its originatorswhat then?
OK, don't even try to answer these
questions, don't even start to read this ~ssay
until you're in the right mood. Followmg a
good sleep and healthy breakfast. Your mouth
holding a pen crosswise, not by its end. A
sunny day and pleasant breeze, maybe some
exercise or some time in the park. When you
want to be right here, right where you are.
After an ocean of love. That could make all
the difference. And this difference . is not
merely personal: Associations, organizations,
governments, and cultures call forth., are
marked by, and nourish or starve particular
moods. Moods may be political; they may be
manipulated to advance both personal and
political ends.
What is a mood? With roots in Old
English, Gothic German, and Old Norse
words for mind, spirit, courage, and anger,
mood is typically defined as an individu~l 's

particular and temporary feeling or state of mmd,
a distinctive emotional quality or tone, a
pervading impression or general attitude or tone of
some thing or some time, and a person's
inclination or disposition or receptivity or temper
to some activity or thing. (The term also has
specialized and precise meanings i~ logic (as
classification of categorical syllogtsms) and
grammar (as categories of verb inflection to
indicate syntactic relations among clauses or
attitudes of speakers with respect to
certainty I uncertainty, wish/ command, a~d
emphasis/hesitancy. I note here that the m~m
character discussed in this essay's next sectwn
is a grammar teacher - in part a teacher of
moods.) Mood is most often attributed to
individuals, but a mood may be a feature of a
social group, political regime, or historical era
- e.g., the mood of a people during a wa~ or
the mood of an age of enlightenment or hme

of famine - or to creative works - e.g., the
characteristic mood of a painter's period of
work or the tone of a piece of music - or a
location - e.g., the mood of a military
cemetery or the feel of a lake house. In her
song, "Ventura," Lucinda Williams (2003)
sings:
Haven't spoken to no one
Haven't been in the mood
Pour some soup, get a spoon and
Stir it up real good.
Sometimes "mood" is used almost
synonymously with "feeling" or "emotion"such that, for example, to be in a good mood
is simply to feel cheerful or have positive
emotions and to be in a bad mood is to feel
irritated or suffer from negative emotions.
Many psychologists, however, differentiate
emotion and mood. In these cases, an emotion
or "emotional episode" is characterized as an
experience marked by: a particular (usually
relatively short-term) quality and caused by
particular physiological (e.g., neurol~?ical
and endocrinal) changes and condthons;
behaviors (e.g.; smiling or running away)
caused by and consistent with this experience;
attention directed toward an eliciting
stimulus; cognitive appraisal of the meaning
and possible consequences of the stimulus;
and, attribution of the genesis of the
experience to the stimulus. An important
point here is that emotions are not reacti,o ns to
perceptions and then, afterwards, th~ caus~ of
bodily expressions. Instead, perceptions gtve
rise to bodily expressions the awareness of
which is emotion. William James (1981 [1890])
put this nicely: "Bodily changes follow
directly the perception of the exciting fact,
and . . . our feeling of the same changes as
they occur is the emotion." We feel sorry
because we cry and afraid because we
tremble, James explained; we do not cry
because we feel sorry or tremble because we
are afraid. Without the bodily expressions
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following perception, those perceptions
would be wholly cognitive - we might judge
it best to run but we "should not actually feel
afraid" (1065-66). So characterized, emotions
are brought about by something, are feelings of
bodily reactions to something, and are about
something cognitively appraised. Examples
include anger, fear, sadness, happiness,
disgust, and surprise. Indeed, many
researchers argue that these are the six, and
only, universal emotions. That may be right,
but I'd like to think that the sentiment of
rationality - James's phrase for the fact that
rationality itself is a sentiment - might be
very widespread too.
By contrast, a mood is characterized as
an affective state that lasts longer than an
emotion and often is temporally distant from
the stimulus and its resulting behavior that is
its cause (e.g., waking up one morning in a
bad mood because of an argument several
months earlier or being depressed years after
the death of a loved one). This includes
moods brought on by causes unrecognized by
the given individual - causes such as
nutrition, weather, facial muscles, physical
activity, persistent poverty, a culture of
violence, structural absence of opportunity,
and so on. A mood is more diffuse and
general than an emotion - less about
something in particular that is cognitively
appraised and more about everything in
general (e.g., anxiety not about an important
exam in an hour but about one's whole
future); less a reaction to something in
particular than a reaction to life more
generally (e.g., irritability brought on not by
one particular co-worker but by absolutely
everyone around); and less brought on by
something particular but, instead, more
sustained across many different particular
experiences (e.g., a depressive state due to the
So characterized,
totality of one's self).
moods are relatively long term, broad scope,
and diffuse affective states. From this
perspective, moods are generally viewed as
having two primary dimensions or valences:
positive affect (and the positive consequences

of this affect) and negative affect (and the
negative consequences of this affect); that is,
being in a good mood or being in a bad
mood.
Examples
of
moods
include
depression, anxiety, resignation, confidence,
and serenity.
I accept and want to make use of the
notion of mood understood in this brief,
unfinished but, I hope, workable sketch. That
said, I also want to add four important points
to this account of mood. First, any adequate
account of mood must be shady. This means it
must not claim neat separations between
instincts,
emotions,
moods,
and
temperaments. Rather, they blur into one
another. To note this is simply to extend an
observation by James
(1981
[1890]):
"Instinctive
reactions
and
emotional
expressions thus shade imperceptibly into
each other" (1058). So too do emotions,
moods, and temperaments. We can feel
hopeful or be in a hopeful mood or have a
hopeful temperament. Somebody can just be
an anxious person, find one's self in an
anxious mood, or feel anxious. As James (1981
[1890]) noted, "The result of all this flux is
that the merely descriptive literature of the
emotions is one of the most tedious parts of
psychology. And not only is it tedious, but
you feel that its subdivisions are to a great
extent either fictitious or unimportant, and
that its pretences to accuracy are a sham"
(1064). Differences in both life and language
among instincts, emotions, moods, and
temperaments are shady, blurry, vague. An
emotion can coexist with or produce a mood
or a temperament over time, but so too a
mood can call forth and exist simultaneously
with a particular emotion.
I go out with a friend
Maybe a little music might help
But I can't pretend
I wish I was somewhere else (Williams
2003).
Second, any adequate account of mood
must be transactional. This means that moods

are not wholly subjective or wholly objective.
Rather, they are what James called
"double-barreled," applying to both the how
and the what of experience, features of
irreducibly interrelated consciousness and
object. Moods are what John Dewey (1989
[1949]) called "unfractured" -without radical
separation between knower and known,
namer
and
named,
organism
and
environment, subject and object (96-97). For
Heidegger as for Dewey, moods are features
of a world, not simply subjective overlays or
reactions to it. Just as Dewey asserted that
reality possesses practical character, so too it
possesses affective character. Reality is
moody. Our ordinary language captures this
and displays our unsettlement about our
being in a mood or a mood being in us. Place:
The dark streets were foreboding, tense,
unforgiving, full of danger, without hope.
Action: The gunfire was terrifying, scary,
frightening, horrific. Person: After her death,
he was disconsolate, depressed, unable to
cope, dark, without joy. Time: "Ah distinctly, I
remember, it was in the bleak December," the
mood was grim, there were shootings almost
every day, it was a dismal period. The
affective is thick and stretches across our
lives. In now-outdated language, tertiary
qualities are features of reality - and that
includes emotion, mood, and temperament.
Mood colors, fixes, and transforms both the
how and the what of experience.
Third, affect includes more than instinct,
feeling, and mood. It is ambient and
atmospheric. It also includes temperament. By
temperament I mean not just a person's or a
group's habit of mind, but something more
expansive - one's habit of living, one's
constitution or characteristic modes of feeling
and action. As feelings come and go and
shade into more diffuse moods that may last a
while or longer, so too moods often shade and
blur into temperaments. In such cases, moods
become habitual in duration and wide in
scope - affective undergoings, doings, and
dispositions across wide swaths of one's life.
They become whole climates rather than the

weather one particular day or even one
season. This points to another standard or
dictionary meaning of "temperament" that
sheds additional light: temperament is the
condition of the weather or climate, regarded
as resulting from a combination of heat or
or
humidity.
One's
cold,
dryness
temperament is one's personal weather. We
all know some people who are warm, others
who are cold, some who are arid, and yet
others who are stormy (and so on).
Understood this way, temperament shares
more with feeling and less with mood a
connection with action and disposition to
action. Icy feelings and an icy temperament
are called forth and displayed in icy behavior;
an icy mood is more atmospheric - "I had no
idea you were in that kind of mood!" -and
may be barely evident in action. Affects blur
along a temporal arc of shorter-term feelings,
longer-lasting moods, and relatively durable
tern peramen ts.
The fourth point about moods is this:
They have causes. They are the product of
physiological, environmental, and cultural
conditions. The fact that a person may not
know what brought on a mood (e.g., "I have
no idea why I'm in such an unhappy mood")
does not mean that the existence of the mood
is irreducibly mysterious or unknowable. Just
as it is possible to manufacture feelings (e.g.,
"If I let her in on this secret, she will be so
jealous"), so too it is possible to manufacture
moods (e.g., "We had to get out of the Pacific
Northwest to cure his seasonal affective
disorder," or, "Whenever the manager turned
on Fox News, I felt anger at Trump and my
whole mood turned confrontational and
hostile"). This has potential practical
implications for anyone marketing products,
ideas, or regimes - or even philosophies if one
accepts Deleuze and Guattari's (1994 [1991])
observation that "philosophy has not
remained
unaffected by the general
movement that replaced Critique with sales
promotion" (10). As it is possible to inflame a
crowd, create desires, learn emotions and
emotional responses, produce belief, and

engineer consent, so it is possible to
manufacture mood - crucial perhaps in some
kinds of administration of populations.
Individual and social moods, then, are
shady and transactional, blurring back and
forth with feeling and temperament, and
caused by conditions that, if known, may be
manipulated to advance both personal and
political ends.
2. Weatherlessness
In light of this general understanding of
mood, I want to focus briefly on a particular
mood for the purpose of reflecting on its
origins and its political as well as personal
uses. I take the name for this mood weatherlessness- from the novelist John Barth.
To be weatherless is to be in a moodless
mood, to be without climate, without feeling,
freedom, or purpose. When habitual, it is the
complete absence of disposition and
inclination, the absence of any temperament.
It is to be helpless, unable to act and without
desires or goals, paralyzed to the point of
inaction. Just as Hemingway recorded the
death of love after World War I in The Sun
Also Rises, so Barth recounted the death of the
will after World War II in his 1958 novel, The
End of the Road (1969 [1958]). Hemingway
chronicled the "lost generation" while Barth
illuminated the "submission generation." For
the book's "hero," Jacob Horner, there is no
convincing reason to prefer or do anything
and so he does nothing (except at the
command
of
the
"Doctor,"
a
psychiatrist-counselor-men tor-God,
as
impersonal, aloof, and inexplicable as fate).
The book opens with a six-word
sentence
suggesting
uncertainty
and
absurdity: "In a sense, I am Jacob Horner"
(Barth 1969 [1958], 1). Next: "It was on the
advice of the Doctor that I entered the
teaching
profession."
The
mood
of
weatherlessness and a temperament of
paralysis are set quickly: Readers are treated
to two long paragraphs dealing solemnly
with the vexing problems of how to sit

properly in the Doctor's office and the equally
grave problem of how one's arms should be
placed. After discussing the shifting of
positions and arms, Jacob Horner tells us that
the story of his life is contained in the
sentence which says that this shifting is a
"recognition of the fact that when one is faced
with such a multitude of desirable choices, no
one choice seems satisfactory for very long by
comparison with the aggregate desirability of
all the rest, though compared to any one of
the others it would not be found inferior."
This sentence, which Jacob Horner describes
as "a double predicate nominative expression
in the second independent clause of a rather
intricate compound sentence" (Barth 1969
[1958], 2-3), not only shows that Horner is a
grammar teacher but also reveals Barth's
contempt for conventional rules and societal
customs, for sense and order, for logic and
principles. Jacob Horner's mastery of these
techniques was no avail against his
impotency.
You like it under the trees in autumn,
Because everything is half dead
The wind moves like a cripple among the
leaves
And repeats words without meaning.
... you yourself were never quite yourself
And did not want nor have to be,
Desiring the exhilarations of changes:
The motive for metaphor, shrinking from
The weight of primary noon,
The ABC of being (Stevens 1993 [1947],
288).
Factually and briefly, The End of the Road
is a story supposedly written by Jake Horner
in 1955 about an incident, which took place in
1953, an event caused by the advice of the
strange Doctor whom Horner met in 1951 and
with whom he is doomed to serve the rest of
his aimless, empty life. The novel opens with
the Doctor's advice to Jake Horner to go to
third-rate Wicomico State Teachers College in
Maryland's Eastern Shore to get a job
teaching grammar. At Wicomico, Jake's first

and only friend is Joe Morgan, a liberal
academic "emancipated" from objective
values: "What the hell, Jake," says Joe, "when
you say good-by to objective values, you
really have to flex your muscles and keep
your eyes open, because you're on your own.
It takes energy; not just personal energy, but
cultural energy, or you're lost. Energy's what
makes the difference between American
pragmatism and French existentialism where the hell else but in America could you
have a cheerful nihilism, for God's sake?"
(Barth 1969 [1958], 47). Jake had also said
goodbye to objective values -after all, he had
been ordered by the Doctor to read Sartre and
to be an existentialist and instructed that
"Choosing is existence: To the extent you
don't choose, you don't exist" (Barth 1969
[1958], 83) - but he did not accept Joe's
cheerful spirit. He had no experience of
himself as a unified self. Jake claimed:
"Indeed, the conflict between individual
points of view that Joe admitted lay close to
heart of his subjectivism I should carry even
further, for subjectivism implies a self, and
where one feels a plurality of selves, one is
subject to the same conflict on an intensely
intramural level, each of one's selves claiming
the same irrefutable validity for its special
point of view that, in Joe's system individuals
and institutions may claim" (Barth 1969
[1958], 142). Here Barth pokes fun at the
American Dream, American progressivism,
and meliorism that smile in the face of
adversity and hope for better things ahead.
Jake does not smile. He is immobilized,
helpless, sapped of will, doomed to
immobility and living what Wallace Stevens
(1993 [1949]) characterized as a "skeleton's
life" in" As You Leave the Room":
I wonder, have I lived a skeleton's life,
As a disbeliever in reality,
A countryman of all the bones in the
world?
Now, here, the snow I had forgotten
becomes
Part of a major reality, part of

An appreciation of a reality
And yet nothing has been changed except
what is
Unreal, as if nothing had been changed at
all (488).
Joe kept pushing his wife, Rennie,
toward Jake and found ways for them to
spend time together. When he learns of their
affair, Joe makes it the subject of long, open
philosophical conversations, as he does when
Rennie becomes pregnant (whether by Jake or
Joe no one knows). After a discussion of death
as the only alternative to bearing the
unwanted child, the three discuss another
alternative, abortion. Jake's Doctor agrees to
perform the abortion, the price being
complete ownership of Jake for the rest of his
life. Rennie is killed on the operating table,
leaving Jake to break the news to Joe. Joe
disappears into oblivion while Jake departs
by taxi for the Doctor's Remobilization Farm
where he is fated to live his life in complete
dependence on, and total submission to, the
Doctor. The book's final word- Jake says this
to the driver - is "Terminal" (Barth 1969
[1958], 198).
Weatherlessness: After recounting a
dream in which a meteorologist announces
that there simply will be no weather
tomorrow, Jake says this:
A day without weather is unthinkable, but
for me at least there were frequently days
without any mood at all. On these days,
Jacob Horner, except in a meaningless
metabolistic sense, ceased to exist, for I was
without a personality. Like those
microscopic specimens that biologists must
dye in order to make them visible at all, I
had to be colored with some mood or other
if there was to be a recognizable self to me.
The fact that my successive and
discontinuous selves were linked to one
another by the two unstable threads of
body and memory; the fact that in the
nature of Western languages the word

disClosure

Vol. 28: Affect

change presupposes something upon
which the changes operate; the fact that
although the specimen is invisible without
the dye, the dye is not the specimen- these
are considerations of which I was aware
but in which I had no interest. On my
weatherless days my body sat in a rocking
chair and rocked and rocked and rocked,
and my mind was as nearly empty as
interstellar space (Barth 1969 [1958], 36).
And like the bodies of individual persons, so
too political bodies may sit in a rocking chair,
just rocking and empty.
3. Manufactured Helplessness and Politics

Barth's novel presented a mood of
weatherlessness, the absence of temperament
and disposition - the death of the will- and
the resulting paralysis and impotence of
action primarily as an individual's (Jacob's)
and
as
a
psychological
condition
philosophical problem (if one makes certain
"existentialist" assumptions about the world,
freedom and choice, and values). I want now
to consider weatherlessness and the death of
the will in a more explicitly political context
because I find these ideas illuminate central
commitments and problems for democratic
practice - for practices that broadly value and
are marked by broad participation, consent,
and benefit of the governed. To do this, it is
necessary to view weatherlessness not simply
as an individual trait but as a social product something socially manufactured (indirectlywhether fully conscious or not - via
sentiments) in particular ways in particular
and
places
with
particular
times
consequences for particular selves. The reason
for doing this is straight-forward: the self, to
use the language of George Herbert Mead, is
a social product (and so there can be no
question about mood being either only
wholly personal or only wholly social). It is
also necessary to view weatherlessness as a
cultural deployment - a strategy (conscious or
not) on behalf of particular interests and

powers, particular forms of government, and
particular cultural relations.
In this light, it is helpful to contrast
weatherlessness and the death of the will with
two other phenomena: learned helplessness
and manufactured
consent. Following
Seligman (1975a, 1975b, and 1993), learned
helplessness is a condition in which a person,
after a traumatic experience or repeated harm
and failure, learns powerlessness and absence
of control and then gives up even trying,
taking no action to avoid subsequent harm even in subsequent changed conditions in
which the harm could be escaped or stopped.
Two points stand out here: the helplessness
learned in the original situation is warranted
- the subject actually is helpless with respect
to the given trauma or harm; and, in later
changed
conditions,
the
habituated
helplessness does not appear warranted to
third-party observers who know surely the
conditions have changed such that the person
is no longer helpless, but it does appear
warranted to the person who has no reason to
realize that conditions have changed - and
who finally does act to avoid trauma or harm
only after being shown that this is possible. In
learned helplessness, then, the self first
discovers it has no effective power to act, no
ability to achieve its goals, and then
concludes there is no point acting. This
paralysis of will, understood as a habit, is the
result of actual helplessness in a given
environment. In cases of weatherlessness, in
contrast, the self first finds itself in an
indifferent,
no-mood
mood,
without
temperament or disposition, and this mood
washes over will, drowning it, the self then
having no inclination to act at all. In learned
helplessness, the self's will to act is defeated
by its actual environment. And the self learns
that fact. In weatherlessness, the self's will is
defeated by its own indifferent mood and
a-disposed
temperament
(and
the
physiological, environmental, and cultural
forces that create and sustain this mood and
temperament). And the self expresses that fact.
The result is the same - paralysis of action;

however, the cause is different (and, therefore,
any remedy also would be different).
Manufactured
consent,
following
Lippmann (who coined the term in his 1922
Public Opinion) and Herman and Chomsky
(who took it up in their 1968 Manufacturing
Consent), is the idea that formally or
outwardly democratic regimes can support
themselves without any overt coercion by
employing propaganda-functioning mass
communications that create citizen consent.
Here the roles of the media and manufactured
consent in a democracy are viewed as
functionally parallel to the roles of the
military and violence in an old-fashioned
dictatorial or openly authoritarian regime.
Understood in a political context, both
manufactured consent and weatherlessness
are societal creations. However, in these two
cases of manufacturing, both the immediate
producers and the resulting product are very
different. Manufactured consent produces just
that - consent - through the work of
profit-driven corporations and investors who
utilize mass media, government agencies, and
regulation of social interactions to serve their
private interests. Weatherlessness, on the
other hand, produces vapid spectatorship,
non-engagement, and non-allegiance in
politics as a result of an indifferent mood and
a temperament lacking all disposition.
Weatherlessness does not manufacture
consent
or dissent; it manufactures
a-consent, even "sleeping through a
revolution."
And it may well be that we will have to
repent in this generation. Not merely for the
vitriolic words and the violent actions of the
bad people, but for the appalling silence and
indifference of the good people who sit
around and say, "Wait on time." (King, Jr.
1968)
Yes, but weatherlessness is not a long
marking of time, a waiting on time. It is not
waiting, even long-game waiting; it is only
sitting - paralysis without expectation or
anticipation.
Viewed
it is clear that

weatherlessness is fatal for democracy - for
any government of, by, and for the people. The
point is not simply that those who are
weatherless do not participate. That is true at
the individual level. However, at the social
level, weatherlessness is not simply the death
of
some
individual's
will.
Rather,
weatherlessness in effect is the outsourcing of
the will, a space that allows the creation of a
people's surrogate will. In the End of the Road,
for example, from the novel's start at
Wicomico State Teachers College to its end en
route to the Remobilization Farm, Jake does
not really himself act at all- but only on the
instruction of, only under the control of, the
Doctor. Weatherlessness is a means to, and a
mark of, authoritarian political regimes.
Here is a natural history or genealogy of
authoritarian politics in democratic disguise:
At first, those who will not consent must be
rendered unable to oppose effectively - the
work of armies, jailers, and executioners;
then, that opposition, frequently so difficult to
control, must be remanufactured more
efficiently into consent - the work of
advertisers and marketers, mass media
professionals, and private corporations;
finally, consen_t, frequently unable to keep
hidden the traces of its manufacture (and so
remain effective), must be retooled as
and its paralysis of
weatherlessness
inclination and action - the work of mood
managers and temperament creators via one's
physiology,
environment,
and
culture
(including one's self).

Like all forms of government, democracy is
moody (and I think it is very useful to think of
democracy as a mood, affect, and
temperament rather than merely a doctrine or
set of practices). The mood of illiberal
democracy - external trappings of democratic
government adopted by anti-democratic ways
of life
is, at least in large part,
weatherlessness. In such regimes, popular
unrest, political protest, and social action are
mood disorders. The Doctor's message to
Jake, Donald Trump's message to Americans,
Xi Jinping's message to the Chinese, Viktor

Orban's message to Hungarians, Hitler's
message to the Germans: Trust me. When
Trump proclaims "Make America Great
Again," he is not laying out any platform; ~e
is expressing and strengthening, among his
tribe, a mood. Mood blurs into temperament.

Temperament separated from will is an abstraction
and without motivation. Will separated from hope
makes hope ineffective, mere wish. This hope is a
mood.
I close with three points about
weatherlessness in political contexts. First, it
is rarely aU-or-nothing. One can be, for
example, weatherless with respect to a
national election but deeply concerned and
involved with local school board issues. This
means that if one views weatherlessness as a
mood blurring into a feeling, there may be
little weatherlessness. One feels the school
shooting is tragic, feels NRA funds in politics
are obscene, or feels perplexed by the idea of
schoolteachers
carrying guns. But if
weatherlessness is seen as a mood shading
toward
temperament,
inclination, and
disposition, then weatherlessness clearly .is
widespread today in American society and I.n
other traditionally liberal and democratic
societies. One sees the televised school
shooting, reads about dark money in politics,
watches pictures of the rainforest set on fire to
clear it, drives past extreme poverty and does
nothing -rocking with Jake Horner in one's
chair. This is paralysis - or its practical
equivalent. Weatherlessness is not merel~ the
paralysis of wish; it is also the paralysis of
action.
Second, how is this produced? Both
psychologically and politically.
James
described brilliantly the physical process on
the nerves - he called it an "economy of
nerve-paths" - by which emotion slides in~o
inattention
and
indifference.
(This
explanation captures many lives to date in the
Trump Era - and while I appreciate the
"economy" here, I resent the difficulty of
keeping "perturbation" alive.) Emotions,

James (1981 [1890]) wrote, "blunt themselves by

repetition":
The more we exercise ourselves at
anything, the fewer muscles we employ ...
The first time we saw [some stimulus] we
could perhaps neither act nor think at all,
and had no reaction but organic
perturbation. The emotions of startled
surprise, wonder, or curiosity were the
result. Now we look on with absolutely no
emotion (1089).
Third,
finally
and
importantly,
weatherlessness has more indirect cultural
causes
as
well
as
proximate
emotional/ physiological causes. If every
claim is met with a counter-claim, if every fact
is suspected on the basis of alternative facts, if
a commitment one day is not a commitment
the next, if all news is fake according to
someone, if science and its critics both are
suspect, if many voices shout many messages
equally loudly, if every claim is a lie, there
may come to seem to be little reason to listen
at all. Or, it may be impossible to hear
anything at all but collective background
noise. Indifference in mood and in practice,
weatherlessness, can result from there really
being no difference among all alternatives,
but it also can result from situations in which
it is impossible to judge differences,
impossible to differentiate, impossible any
longer to look on, as James put it, with any
emotion or care. In such cases, Joe was right
when he told Jake that pluralism and
democracy take political and cultural, not just
personal, hope and effort. Hope for that effort
is hope for conditions for a more fully
democratic mood.
Suddenly everyone was run over by a
truck (O'Donoghue 1971, 16).
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